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The Misappropriation Doctrine as a
Competitive Norm of Intellectual
Property Law
Leo J. Raskind*
It is anomalous that our legal system surrounds an eco-
nomic order based on competitive markets, but lacks a compre-
hensive set of legal rules defining competitive behavior. In fact,
the main body of law that relates to norms of market behavior
of competitive rivals does so only tangentially, consisting of two
elements: a series of statutes, such as the antitrust laws and
the intellectual property statutes; and a body of case law de-
rived from common law tort doctrines.
Given the specialized nature of the statutory law, the task
of defining and controlling competitive norms has traditionally
been relegated to the amorphous body of case law known as the
"misappropriation" doctrine.1 Analysis of this doctrine, how-
ever, reveals gaps in its analytical framework. For example,
the doctrine contains no criteria derived from competition.
This omission contrasts with intellectual property law cases in
which courts invoke the misappropriation doctrine to remedy
allegations of "piracy" or "dirty tricks," instead of relying on
statutory principles to resolve the conflict.2
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School, 1991. I acknowledge with appreciation suggestions
made by Robert C. Denicola, Margaret Larson Professor of Intellectual Prop-
erty, University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law, and Vernon Ruttan, Re-
gents Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. I thank Mark W.
Page, 3L, University of Minnesota Law School, for his assistance in the prepa-
ration of this Essay.
1. The misappropriation doctrine "differs from the ordinary case of un-
fair competition in trade principally in this that, instead of selling its own
goods as those of complainant, it [the seller] substitutes misappropriation in
the place of misrepresentation, and sells complainant's goods as its own." In-
ternational News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918); see also
Gary Van Zeelant Talent, Inc., v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 223, 267 N.W.2d 242,
251-52 (1978) (misappropriation doctrine does not protect consumer lists).
2. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 681, 688-
97, 439 N.E.2d 526, 532-37 (1982) (under misappropriation doctrine proposed
stock market indexing contract violated Dow Jones's proprietary rights in the
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This Essay traces the development of the much-criticized
misappropriation doctrine3 and presents its analytical basis.
Part I presents the nature of the problem. Part II analyzes the
seminal opinion of International News Service v. Associated
Press. Part III examines the relevant legal history and econom-
ics of the misappropriation doctrine. Part IV presents a revised
analytical basis for the misappropriation doctrine that incorpo-
rates competitive principles, and suggests how a court might ap-
ply the proposed analysis to intellectual property cases.
In short, this Essay argues that when courts hear patent,
copyright, and trademark cases in which statutory protection is
inappropriate, but nonetheless the conduct of a party is charac-
terized as "chiseling," "piracy," "unethical," or the like, they
should begin their analysis by considering the competitive rela-
tionship from which the claim originates. The clear legislative
expression of a preference for competition contained in federal
antitrust laws warrants this approach.4 Moreover, courts in
these cases should recognize the Supreme Court's continued
emphasis on the preemptive effect given federal legislation re-
lating to competition.5 Ancillary doctrines that impinge on
competition, such as misappropriation, should be invoked spar-
ingly. From this perspective, courts should consider allegedly
"inappropriate" conduct as an element of behavior in a compet-
itive market context; within that framework, courts should
view such conduct as an element of cost that a seller, as a com-
index); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J. Super.
368, 381, 341 A.2d 348, 352 (1975) (applying misappropriation doctrine to the
copying of recorded music, even though defendant complied with applicable
copyright statutes); Mercury Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consul-
tants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 173-87, 218 N.W.2d 705, 709-13 (1973) (applying doc-
trine to record piracy).
3. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspir-
acy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hun-
dred thousand dollars, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
Similarly, the Clayton Act promotes competition through prohibiting un-
fair trade practices with respect to: price setting, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988); agree-
ments not to use the goods of competitors, 15 U.S.C § 14 (1988); corporate
acquisition of stock, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988); banking, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988); and
common carriers, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1988).
5. See infra note 67.
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petitor, considers when determining how much of a particular
product to offer. The details of these criteria are developed
below.
To the extent that the disparate body of statutory law re-
lates to market behavior, it does so selectively. Taken together,
these statutes do not set out the legal conditions for organizing
a competitive market; nor do they address the limits of compet-
itive rivalry within such markets. Overall, these statutes con-
cern competition only as part of a larger legislative purpose.
For example, the Sherman and Clayton Acts together express a
legislative preference for competition.6 They address the con-
duct of competitors, however, only with regard to selected as-
pects of business decisions. Section one of the Sherman Act
bars collective and collusive action among sellers with regard to
price determination, i.e., price-fixing.7 Similarly, boycotts, tying
arrangements, information sharing, merging, and monopolizing
are proscribed conduct only in terms of these specific practices.8
Congress and courts have developed these categories of il-
legality as part of a larger legislative design to limit economic
power and to protect consumer welfare. 9 The Federal Trade
Commission Act,10 which bars "unfair methods of competition,"
is an example of a legislative attempt to reinforce the curbing
of abusive market practices by the use of an administrative
agency."1 Further examples can readily be identified. The
Robinson-Patman Act,' 2 amending section two of the Clayton
Act to bar "discriminatory pricing," was intended to inhibit the
emerging chain store movement of the 1930s from displacing
6. See supra note 4.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
8. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-20 (1988) (price fixing, boycotts, merg-
ing, and information sharing); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988) (tying ar-
rangements and monopolizing).
9. There are different perceptions of the purposes of the antitrust laws.
Compare 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 103 (1978) (multiple
goals of maximizing consumer welfare, dispersing concentrations of wealth,
limiting economic power and business size, and broadening entrepreneurial op-
portunities) with R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR
WIM ITsELF 6 (1978) (a single goal of promoting consumer welfare).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988).
11. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 27-32 (1924).
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988), has been inter-
preted in pari materia with § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1988).
See F.T.C. v. Keppel, 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1988).
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the small, independent grocer. 13 In the 1980s, concern about
the world trading status of the United States led to the enact-
ment of section 1677 of the Trade Act, a provision that bars for-
eign sales below certain cost norms, a practice known as
"dumping. '14 Section 1677 focuses on the pricing decisions of
foreign sellers as part of a larger plan to protect domestic en-
terprise from "unfair competition." In addition, various state
statutes address pricing behavior, but frequently only as to the
distribution of specific products deemed the subjects of special
concern, such as statutes controlling the prices of cigarettes and
alcohol.15
The only clearly comprehensive attempt to provide a gen-
eral statement of the conditions of competition was in the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.16 In attempting to
13. See Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury Under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act- The Concept of 'Competitive' Advantage, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 48,
51 (1975).
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 1677
(1988).
15. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.32, 325D.37, 325D.415 (1990) (controlling
cigarette prices at wholesale); 340A.312(2) (1990) (controlling volume discounts
on liquor); see also Cal. Unfair Practices Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17026, 17043 (West 1987) (unlawful to sell product at less than cost for pur-
pose of injuring competitors; applies to all transactions); Pennsylvania Unfair
Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §§ 212-13 (Purdon 1971) (unlawful to sell, or
offer to sell, merchandise at less than cost with intent or result of diverting
trade, injuring competitor or creating a monopoly in any line of commerce).
16. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (re-
pealed 1935). Enacted by a special session of the Seventy-Third Congress, the
measure was designed to address the entire economic and commercial system.
In signing the measure into law in June of 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt
stated: "History probably will regard the National Industrial Recovery Act as
the most important and far reaching legislation ever enacted by the American
Congress." M. GALLAGHER, GOVERNMENT RULES INDusTRY 2 (1934).
The Act permitted the President to establish the National Recovery Ad-
ministration to execute the legislative mandate. A central purpose of the Act
was to provide Codes of Fair Competition. Id. at 5. The agency, with the vol-
untary assistance of industry and labor groups, adopted a code for virtually
every economic activity. Twenty-two volumes contained comprehensive codes
for activities ranging from the handkerchief industry to bankers, the com-
pressed air industry, optical manufacturing industry, and the dramatic and
musical theatre industry. For each industry a code was prepared by industry
participants and approved by the agency to control wages, hours of labor, and
terms of trade. The Code addressed every aspect of an industry. For example,
in the Code entitled, "Legitimate Full Length Dramatic and Musical Theatri-
cal Industry," there was a provision under Article XVI, Trade Practices, stat-
ing the agreement of employers that it was an unfair trade practice to assist in
the release of any actor from the cast of a theatrical production in order to
accept employment in motion pictures. 1 NRA CODES OF FAIR COMPETITION
90 (1933). Almost all of the Codes dealt in detail with trade practices, e.g., the
[Vol. 75:87.5
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
stimulate recovery from the Great Depression, Congress sought
to bypass the antitrust laws by permitting rival sellers collec-
tively to set price levels. Each industry group would promul-
gate Codes of Fair Competition. Congress anticipated that
prices would rise and generate increased purchasing power.17
This experiment, however, was short-lived, because the Act did
not survive Supreme Court review.
8
Like the antitrust laws and other related statutes, pieces of
legal rules relating to selected aspects of the competitive pro-
cess exist in the body of statutory law that protects intellectual
property. These legal regimes, although designed to provide an
incentive for creative effort by granting rights in patent,19 copy-
right,20 semiconductor chip,21 trademark,22 and trade secret
law,23 function also to affect conduct in the marketplace. Be-
cause the incentive mechanism in these statutes ultimately
gives rise to a commercial transaction in which the owner of
the intellectual property right receives the payment of a roy-
alty or other transfer payment, the intellectual property laws
coincide with the competitive process. 24
Within each of these intellectual property regimes is a link
to the competitive process. For example, when a court enjoins
the reproduction and distribution of a defendant's plat map on
a finding of copyright infringement, that defendant is effec-
tively foreclosed from competing in the market with that prod-
uct. Through its ancillary doctrines, the intellectual property
system further involves the market process. Thus, a patentee
may license another to exploit its patented invention, subject to
the constraining doctrine of patent misuse. By preventing the
Code of the Artificial Flower and Feather Industry provided for terms and dis-
counts of sales transactions, the manner of returning merchandise, and barred
consignment sales, gifts to buyers, advertising allowances, and the assignment
of accounts receivable without NRA approval. Id. at 386.
17. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (re-
pealed 1935).
18. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935), the NIRA
was held unconstitutional as an undue delegation of congressional power to
the executive branch.
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1988).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1157 (1988).
23. Trade secrets are protected under state statutes. Minnesota and 33
other states have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See MINN. STAT.
§ 325C.01-.08 (1990); Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
24. Besen & Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intel-
lectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1991).
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patentee from dictating to its licensee the selling price or other
terms of trade in the resultant product, the doctrine bars the
patentee from expanding the statutory right.25
Similarly, the copyright act has a "fair use" provision con-
straining a proprietor's ability to bar competing uses in terms of
actual or potential competitive market effects. 26 Trademark
protection also affects the competitive market process by re-
stricting product designation and differentiation. Thus, a seller
may not seek to attract customers by closely emulating the
trademark of an established competitor.2 In addition, state
statutes provide trade secret protection permitting independent
discovery of a secret method or process, but proscribing "misap-
propriation" by improper commercial conduct.28
Taken as a group, these statutes touch and concern various
aspects of commercial rivalry, but they are not suited to serve
as a basis for distinguishing "piracy" from competition. The
reason is not difficult to discern. Because each of these statutes
originated in response to a particular economic problem, each
statute is confined to the relevant segment of market conduct
that the statute and subsequent case law interpretations iden-
tify. Although the broader, case law doctrines of misappropria-
tion and unfair competition could potentially address the
25. See Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection" A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1855-64 (1984); Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Pat-
ent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 277-78 (1977).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Among the factors that the Copyright Act di-
rects a court to consider in applying the fair use defense is "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work." Id;
see also Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1662 n.4 (1988) (listing the four factors, enumerated in the Copyright Act of
1976, that courts have looked to in making fair use determinations: "(1) [Ihe
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in re-
lation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for and value of the copyrighted work." (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1976)); Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1603 (1982) (same).
27. Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323,
1333-34 (1980). See Rite Aid Corp. v. Rite-Way Discount Corp., 508 F.2d 828,
830 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
28. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1979 defines "misappropriation" in
part, as follows: "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means." Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(i), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). See Kitch,




problem, they lack an analytical foundation congruent with the
relevant competitive process. This Essay attempts to provide
such a foundation.
II
Originating in the famous International News Service v.
Associated Press case,29 the doctrines of misappropriation and
unfair competition 3° are difficult to understand and apply. Un-
like the statutes aimed at specific aspects of the competitive
process, these doctrines lack a conceptual foundation. The stat-
utes, at least, come with some legislative history to provide a
context for interpretation. In addition, the statutory enactment
often is related to a wider public debate. The Sherman Act, the
depression-based legislation concerning price discrimination,31
and fair trade legislation 32 are examples of such statutes. Simi-
larly, the Clayton Act may be viewed as a congressional re-
spouse to courts' initial narrow interpretation of the Sherman
Act.33
In contrast, the broad doctrine of misappropriation
originated in a judicial opinion involving a unique commercial
"dirty trick" that raised an issue of first impression. The
traditional practice of adapting analogous principles failed to
reveal relevant precedent. Accordingly, a majority opinion of
the Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated
Press launched the misappropriation doctrine in an ad hoc fash-
ion.35 With two powerful reservations noted in concurrence
and dissent, courts and commentators have since noted a lack
of analytical content in the doctrine.36 Despite such criticism,
however, courts in intellectual property cases continue to rely
29. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
30. Id. at 239-40.
31. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
32. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (re-
pealed 1935).
33. G. HENDERSON, supra note 11, at 16.
34. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text (discussing the INS case).
35. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
36. Abrams, Copyrigh4 Misappropriation, and Preemption. Constitu-
tional Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 509, 513-15; Baird,
Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of INS v. AP, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 411, 413-15 (1983); Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Action-
able at the Suit of a Competitor?, 33 MICH. L. REV. 321, 331-32 (1935); Handler,
Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REv. 175, 190-92 (1936); Rahl, The Right to
'Appropriate' Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 57 (1962); Rogers, Unfair
Competition, 17 MicH. L. REv. 490, 491-93 (1919); Stern & Hoffman, Public In-
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on misappropriation as a basis of decision.3 Some courts and
commentators even urge expansion of misappropriation analy-
sis.38 Because of the doctrine's wide usage, it is appropriate to
attempt to refine it.
This Essay asserts that the concept of misappropriation can
be refined and restated in terms congruent with competitive
norms. James Rahl provided a beginning for such an exercise
when he wrote of the misappropriation doctrine: "There is a
valid role [for it ] ... that is to protect trade values against
copying of a sort which will cause their destruction or their
frustration."39 In this sense, the doctrine can serve as a barrier
against competitive behavior that reduces the supply of a given
product to the detriment of social welfare.40 But, the doctrine
must be adapted to the competitive process; such adjustment is
required because, in announcing the misappropriation doctrine,
the court did not craft its opinion in terms of economic analysis.
International News Service v. Associated Press41 is suffi-
ciently familiar to warrant no more than a cursory review of its
facts. In 1915, military censors barred the International News
Service (INS), an organization engaged in the gathering and
publishing of news, from direct access to European news
sources of military operations on the Western Front. The INS
jury and Public Interest- Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competi-
tion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 935, 940-42 (1962).
Judge Learned Hand repeatedly rejected the misappropriation doctrine
and the case that announced it, urging that INS v. AP be confined to its facts,
because it lacked analytical underpinnings. As he saw it, "it cannot be used as
a cover to prevent competitors from ever appropriating the results of the in-
dustry, skill, and expense of others." R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d
86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). See also G. Ricordi v. Haen-
dler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952) (INS decision is to be strictly confined to
its facts); National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191
F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951) (unwilling to apply misappropriation doctrine in
absence of copyright); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d
Cir. 1929) (INS not intended to establish a general doctrine), cert denied, 281
U.S. 728 (1930).
37. See supra note 2.
38. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987); San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). See also Sell, The Doctrine
of Misappropriation In Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REv. 483, 496-99
(1958) (misappropriation doctrine furthers value of free competition).
39. See Rahl, supra note 36, at 73.
40. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARcHE 211 (1975) (cit-
ing an example of a dominant firm causing misallocation of resources by re-
stricting output).
41. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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then began a course of conduct calculated to use the work of its
competitor news-gathering association, the Associated Press
(AP). This conduct consisted of three acts: It bribed AP em-
ployees to disclose AP news prior to, or contemporaneously
with, dissemination to its members;2 it induced AP member-
newspapers to disclose news from the association to INS in di-
rect violation of association by-laws;43 and, it made unauthor-
ized copies of association news stories from bulletin boards and
from earlier published editions of association newspapers, re-
printing the purloined stories without attribution in its own
newspapers on the west coast." Associated Press sought in-
junctive relief against all three acts: but the trial court enjoined
only the first two. On appeal, AP argued that, without en-
joining the third act, the relief was ineffective; the appellate
court agreed, employing the misappropriation rationale to en-
join the copying of uncopyrighted matter.45 Prior to this deci-
sion, the idea that unprotected material was in the public
domain and could be copied freely, without recourse to an alter-
native mode of protection such as unfair competition, had been
accepted as a hornbook maxim of copyright law.46
At the outset, the majority opinion announced its novel ap-
proach, noting that "we need spend no time... upon the gen-
eral question of . . . [protection] in news matter . . . since it
seems to us the case must turn on the question of unfair compe-
tition in business."47
Finding no direct authority to support its view of unfair
competition in these circumstances, the majority improvised
one from the trademark cases. In trademark cases, however,
the phrase "unfair competition" had come to mean passing-off
on the consumer the goods or services of one seller as those of a
competing rival.48 Thus, the doctrine of unfair competition, as
developed in earlier cases, had no direct application to this case
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id.
44. I&
45. Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244, 253 (2d Cir.
1917), qff'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
46. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 252
(1905) (transmission of exchange quotations enjoined only on the basis of in-
ducing breach of contract). See also National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 296 (1902) (matter gathered and transmitted by telegraph
company is not copyrightable).
47. INS, 248 U.S. at 236.




because INS sold the purloined word order exclusively in its
own newspapers as its own product.
Consequently, in adapting the passing-off analysis to this
case, the court emphasized unfairness rather than competition,
thereby announcing a maxim of competitive ethics. The major-
ity opinion states: "The right to acquire property by honest la-
bor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to
protection as the right to guard property already acquired ....
It is this right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction... of
unfair competition. '49
Characterizing AP's right as a "quasi-property" interest in
its gathered news, the court provided the rationale for which it
is most often cited, namely that
the labor, costs, and skill of a competitor may be protected from cer-
tain competitive conduct of its market rival.... [The defendant...
admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complain-
ant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill,
and money... and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as
its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown.50
Both the dissent of Justice Brandeis and the concurrence
of Justice Holmes identify the flaws in the majority opinion's
analysis. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the "quasi-prop-
erty" characterization was inappropriate because expenditures
do not necessarily create property rights. Brandeis stated, "the
fact that a product ... has cost its producer money and labor,
and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not suffi-
cient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property."51 His ma-
jor objection anticipated the substantial critical literature that
this case evoked. He pointed out that the competitive relation-
ship of the parties was central to the case, noting that the ac-
tions of INS "may be inconsistent with a finer sense of
propriety . . . [but] competition is not unfair in a legal sense
merely because the profits gained are unearned, even if made
at the expense of a rival."5 2
Justice Holmes succinctly rejected the majority's premise
that AP has a protectable interest in its news, noting that
"property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although
exchangeable. 5 3 Thus, by rejecting the "quasi-property" ra-
tionale of the majority, Justice Holmes rejected the premise
49. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236-37 (emphasis added).
50. Id at 239-40.
51. Id at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 257-59 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. Id at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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that a property interest exists in news simply because news was
sold (exchanged) for money (value).
Justice Holmes, however, joined the majority, urging in his
concurrence that the competitive relationship of the parties be
taken into account by requiring INS to credit AP as the source
of the news. Absent attribution by INS, Justice Holmes would
have enjoined INS's publication of AP news on the west coast
during the time differential between the regions. Thus, over
the protest of two powerful voices, the majority announced a
rule involving competitors that was inconsistent with the pro-
cess of market competition.
The tort doctrine of passing-off, from which the INS major-
ity drew its theory of misappropriation, relates to an entirely
different aspect of competition. Passing-off and its successor
doctrine, trademark protection, attach to the entrepreneurial
decision of whether to market a new product. Trademark pro-
tection governs the conduct of rivals in designing and present-
ing their products and services in the market. Trademark law
establishes a competitive norm - no deception of consumers by
falsely identifying the source of products. Hence, close copying
of trademarks and trade dress is unlawful if the similarity
would mislead consumers about the identity of the actual
seller.M Similarly, tort doctrines of product disparagement
form a standard of conduct for sellers attempting to attract cus-
tomers.55 From the seller's perspective, the decision is a mar-
keting one: how to designate the product to appeal 'to
customers. The seller makes this decision only after it has de-
cided to sell a particular product - in the INS case, news.
As derived from the INS majority opinion, misappropria-
tion is a doctrine out of step with the underlying decisional pro-
cess of a competitor. As a business decision, INS took AP news
in order to have a saleable product. This decision did not con-
cern marketing, rather, it concerned the selection of the prod-
uct to be marketed. This distinction is significant because it
reveals that INS management did not consider the need to ap-
peal to buyers when it decided to enter the market as a seller
of news. To be sure, the prospective market entrant considers
the existence of. potential customers, but that consideration is
part of the calculation of expected revenue. Moreover, the
54. Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co., 302 F. Supp. 156, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), offd, 429 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970).
55. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); U-Haul Int'l v. Jar-
tran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1149-50 (D. Ariz. 1984).
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market entrant decides how to designate the product - by
trademark or otherwise - only later in the decisional process.
Accordingly, by relying on the legal doctrine of passing-off as
the basis for the misappropriation doctrine, the INS majority
failed to illuminate the proper relationship between INS and
AP as rival sellers of the same product.-6
When one analyzes the conduct of INS from the perspec-
tive of an entrepreneurial decisionmaker in a competitive mar-
ket, two analytical consequences follow. As Justice Brandeis
noted in his dissent, the ethical characterization lapses because
competition is synonymous with rivalry.5 Moreover, INS's
conduct is revealed as that of a seller making the cost/revenue
calculus associated with acquiring a product with which to com-
pete. Viewing the actions of INS in the context of competition
as a process, INS behaved as an entrepreneur seeking to mini-
mize the cost of a basic input of its final product. When mili-
tary censors barred INS from access to news about events on
the Western Front, they also deprived INS of a basic input of
its final product. In these circumstances, the decision to bribe
and to copy as a means of obtaining war news can be character-
ized as a rational economic, cost-minimizing decision.sa INS re-
sponded to a sudden escalation in the cost of a raw material by
finding a lower cost substitute in the uncopyrighted literary
material of a competitor. Putting aside the extra-legal issue of
commercial ethics, the taking of AP news was essentially a
competitor's decision on the cost side of its economic equation.
In this context, the case raises the competitive issue of the ex-
tent to which a competitor may lawfully enter the market
arena without incurring the same cost structure as a rival.
Introducing the concept of "quasi-property" diverts the in-
quiry. The defect in the majority opinion is that it relies on a
legal doctrine relating to the marketing side of competition and
cloaks that doctrine with the status of property. The majority
then sought to provide an analysis of a taking of an undefined
56. As noted above, the passing-off doctrine is concerned with maintaining
the proper marketing relationships between competitors, not with establishing
competitive norms to apply when a market entrant produces a product to mar-
ket. In this case, INS was neither undertaking to steal AP customers nor to
confuse them as to the source of the news. Instead, it sought to offer the same
product without incurring the same costs of production, presumably in the be-
lief that although not "nice," taking AP uncopyrighted news was lawful. INS,
248 U.S. at 217-18.
57. See supra text accompanying note 51.
58. Aichian, Costs and Outputs, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIc RE-
SOURCES 23, 39 (A. Abramovitz ed. 1959).
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property interest in the context of a competitive market in
which taking is the very nature of the relationship. The funda-
mental difficulty that the majority faced was the absence of
common law precedent treating the cost side of competitive ri-
valry. Cost-incurring and cost-saving is, however, an essential
aspect of market competition. Costs in relation to anticipated
revenue determine how much of a product a firm is willing to
supply.59 Further, by definition competition involves offering
consumers alternative products, developed by different meth-
ods that combine ingredients differently, to be sold at competi-
tive prices. These aspects directly relate to the costs that the
enterprise incurs and ultimately to the price and output of that
seller. When applying the misappropriation doctrine, however,
the INS majority failed completely to distinguish these two dif-
ferent aspects of a seller's decisional process - the product de-
velopment side and the marketing side.
Justice Holmes perceived that the passing-off doctrine ap-
plied only to product identification and that this aspect of the
competitive process was not involved in the INS case. He noted
that passing-off and product disparagement relate to the selling
or customer appeal aspect of competition, not to the cost of in-
put side.60 To Justice Holmes, the fact that fresh news was
gathered at great expense did not cloak uncopyrighted news
with the attributes of property: "[1]n my view, the only ground
of complaint that can be recognized without legislation is the
implied misstatement [as to the source] .... [A] suitable ac-
knowledgement of the source is all that the plaintiff can re-
quire."61 Without expressly distinguishing between the input
cost and customer appeal aspects of competition, Justice
Holmes recognized that the majority's passing-off analysis
could not be extended to the issue in the case. By omitting any
59. It should be noted that the cost decisions relate only to the supply side
of the market. The final selling price is determined by the interaction with
the demand side. The present depressed state of the market for office space in
the major cities illustrates this point. When the decision to build most of these
high-rise office buildings was made, the market price for such space was at a
level which promised a high rate of after-tax return. Before 1986, the federal
income tax law dealt favorably with such assets. By the time these multi-year
construction projects were completed, the demand conditions and the tax laws
had changed. For present purposes, the cost calculation in relation to antici-
pated net revenues determined the supply of office buildings; ultimately the
demand conditions determined the market price of the office space. See P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 361-75, 436 (7th ed. 1967).
60. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246-47
(1918).
61. Id at 248 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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judgment of the ethical quality of the conduct of INS manage-
ment, Justice Holmes properly identified the essential competi-
tive rivalry between the parties and recognized the marketing
role of traditional passing-off analysis in the competitive
process.
In his lengthy dissent, Justice Brandeis made copious cita-
tions to copyright, trade secret, and unfair competition cases,
including the English authorities. Curiously, he did not draw
on the line of English cases that had begun to address the com-
petitive cost issue raised in the INS case. In one of these cases,
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co., 62 the plaintiff
sought relief against an industry cartel that had excluded it
from membership and resulting favorable trade terms6 3 In
holding for the defendants, Lord Justice Bowen considered the
legal limits of competitive conduct as follows:
No ... trader... can ... justify damaging another in his commercial
business by fraud or misrepresentation, [i]ntimidation, obstruction....
molestation, intentional procurement of a violation of individual
rights .... [t]he intentional driving away of customers by ... violence
[.. (or] inducing persons ... to break their contracts.... [There was
here no personal intention to do any other or greater harm to the
plaintiffs than such as was necessarily involved in the desire to attract
to the defendants' ships the entire... freights of the ports. [To hold
this illegal] ... would be to convert into an illegal motive the instinct
of self-advancement... which is the very incentive to all trade.
6 4
The Mogul Steamship court identified the inability of tort
doctrines to reach all aspects of the competitive process. The
opinion properly located passing-off and product disparagement
as dealing with the relationship of traders to customers; the
court avoided thrusting these doctrines into the decisional pro-
cess of entrepreneurs involving costs, prices, output, and mar-
ket shares.
In contrast, when announcing that a taking without a prior
expenditure violated a norm of competitive fairness, the INS
majority introduced an analytical formulation concerning the
market relationship between seller and customer into the cost
input side of the competitive process. From this perspective,
62. 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889).
63. Id. at 598-600.
64. Id at 614-15. See also Quinn v. Leatham, [1900-3] All E.R. Rep. 1
(1901) (person has right to earn a living in her own way as long as she does not
violate the law or interfere with legal rights of others); Allen v. Flood, [1895-9]
All E.R. Rep. 52 (1898) (representative of trade union did not act unlawfully in
doing a lawful act with a bad motive - threatening an employer with a strike
if employer refused to terminate a particular employee - where there existed
no contractual right to employment).
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the majority moved into the most dynamic aspect of the com-
petitive process - the input cost side, invoking a precedent that
incorporates a legal norm from the marketing, customer appeal
side - a quite different aspect of competition. Thus, the Court
mismatched analytically the misappropriation doctrine with the
aspect of competition before it.
III
The traditional maxim that nature abhors a vacuum might
be adopted as a legal maxim, stating that a vacuum in the law
will always be filled by divergent analysis. A possible corollary
might be that whenever courts recede to horticultural meta-
phors, there is underlying confusion.6 The misappropriation
doctrine illustrates both versions. Subsequent courts and com-
mentators have supplied various theories for this broad doc-
trine in an effort to erect a working rationale for the
misappropriation doctrine. Aside from Rahl's reference to mar-
ket conditions, the bulk of the suggestions for reform lie along
restitutionary lines.6 In addition, despite the Supreme Court's
repeated application of the federal preemption doctrine to limit
state law intrusion into issues of competition in the national
economy, courts continue to use the misappropriation doc-
trine.67 Accordingly, the continued popularity of the doctrine
65. For an example of this principle in federal income taxation, see Lyon
& Eustice, Assignment of Income: The Fruit and the Tree as Irrigated by P.G.
Lake, 17 TAx L. REV. 293, 295 (1962).
66. Rahl, supra note 36, at 69-76. But see Dawson, The SeU-Serving Inter-
meddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1416-18 (1974) (arguing that those who pursue
their own self-interest should not be allowed to recover in restitution from
others who incidentally benefit); see also Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of
Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57
U. CmI. L. REV. 1009, 1019 n. 41 (1990).
67. Federal preemption was invoked in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964), and in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376
U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964), to strike down a state statute barring copying of unpat-
ented subject matter. The principle was recently repeated in Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-57 (1989), in which a state
statute barring copying of unprotected material by a special process was invali-
dated. See Note, Copyright Protection For Factual Compilations - Reviving
the Misappropriation Doctrine, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 933, 949-50, 952 (1988).
In addition to application of misappropriation analysis in cases involving
news taken by a competitor news organization, for example, Pottstown Daily
News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383, 390-94, 192
A.2d 657, 663-64 (1963), it has been invoked in cases of record piracy, such as A
& M Records v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1978). More
recently, the doctrine has been applied in cases involving protection of stock
indices. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704,
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with courts and commentators, coupled with its present lack of
a working rationale, justifies yet one more attempt to reform
the misappropriation doctrine. This task of refining the doc-
trine might begin with a fragment of relevant legal history and
economics to place the misappropriation doctrine in a competi-
tive market context. A useful starting point is the origin of a
market economy.
Even before the emergence of a market economy in feudal
England, the Crown applied legal constraints to the structure
of markets and to the behavior of their participants.rs In those
times the right to engage in trading required the exercise of the
royal prerogative. Historians note that, as the English kings be-
gan to grant the right to conduct a market or fair, they coupled
that right with authority to control its organization as well as
the conduct of its traders. For example, Edward III granted the
Bishop of Winchester rights to the fair of St. Giles with all its
rents and "rights of jurisdiction. ' 69 This practice culminated in
the sixteenth century, as evidenced by records of routine royal
grants in which the right to conduct a fair was coupled with ju-
risdiction to hold court for the administration of market law.70
The subject matter jurisdiction of these courts was limited ini-
tially to debt and contract claims arising from dealings during
that fair, including the power to enforce breaches of the "just
prices" for staples, such as bread and beer. The subsequent
parliamentary statutes against "forestalling" (buying from sell-
ers before they got to market), "engrossing" (buying in bulk to
increase the price), and "regrating" (buying to resell), reflected
a continuing concern for the conduct of sellers at these fairs. 71
Legal limitations on the behavior of competitors emerged from
710-12 (2d Cir. 1982); Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill. 2d 109, 121-22,
456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (1983). The doctrine was invoked, but not applied in United
States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Systems, 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-41 (3d Cir. 1984).
Some commentators see the doctrine as the implicit framework of decision
in recent copyright cases such as Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 581-82
(D. Mass. 1985), and West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d
1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1986). See Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: The
Misappropriation Alternative, 3 COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1986, at 1, 2-4.
68. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35
YALE L.J. 905, 905-06 (1926).
69. Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q. J. ECON. 231, 234 (1906).
70. . at 235. The courts became known as the court of piepowder be-
cause the parties appearing were merchants whose feet bore dust from the
outdoor markets. The Latin, pede pulverosi, gave way to the label, piepoudres,
which became piepowder in English.
71. An Act Against Regrators, Forestallers & Engrossers, 1552, 5 & 6
Edw. VI ch. 14.
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these cases, including decisions restricting agreements to re-
frain from practicing a trade.72
As simpler trading practices at the fairs, often character-
ized by barter, yielded to the more sophisticated channels of
distribution that the communication and transportation ad-
vances of the Industrial Revolution made possible, the common
law antecedents were adapted and extended.73 These early
legal constraints, however, were not extended to the market
economy of the eighteenth century. Instead, the eighteenth
century marked the advent of advocacy of a new economic or-
der in which the "hidden hand" of private initiative would gen-
erate the optimum social welfare, while the role of the state
would be reduced to providing essential public services. Ac-
cordingly, Adam Smith rejected the need for legislation con-
trolling markets. He characterized the belief in the efficacy of
the forestalling, regrating, and engrossing statutes as being akin
to the popular belief in witchcraft.74 In his exposition of a sys-
tem of private initiative for public benefit, Smith described
both competitive and collusive conduct in markets, providing
many examples derived from his direct observation.75 His anal-
ysis contained policy proscriptions against collusive conduct and
deceitful market conduct, but overall his magisterial treatise
tended to emphasize private, rather than governmental,
initiative.
As the new economic order associated with Adam Smith
became a political reality, the concept of free, unregulated mar-
kets became dominant: such was the power of Smith's analysis.
He inveighed against any intrusion of governmental regulation
into the workings of the marketplace. Consequently, Parlia-
ment repealed the statutes against forestalling, regrating, and
engrossing.76 The role of legal controls was to be limited to the
peripheral functions of markets, modulating the competitive
72. Case of John Dyer Y.B., 2 Hen. V, 5, pl. 26 (1414). These early cases
became the foundation of the contract doctrine governing the enforceability of
covenants not to compete. That contract doctrine became, in turn, the basis of
the Sherman Act's reference to restraints of trade. See W. LETwiN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC PoLIcY IN AMERICA 18-19 (1980).
73. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS 7 (4th ed. 1989) (noting the "intrusion of tort law into the
marketplace").
74. 2 A. SmITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONs Book IV, chap. IV (Rogers ed. 1880) (1st ed. 1776).
75. 1 A. SMITH, supra note 74, at 86.
76. An Act for Repealing Several Laws therein Mentioned Against
Badgers, Engrossers, Forestallers, and Regrators, 1772, 12 Geo. III ch. 71.
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rigor of traders in dealing with their customers and with each
other. In place of regulatory statutes, tort doctrines and such
ancillary principles as fraud, misrepresentation, interference
with contractual relationships, and product disparagement were
applied to regulate trading relations.77
In contrast, Smith's methodology was to theorize from
facts. Smith drew his characterization of competition from his
own observations and experience. As he theorized about the
competitive process, he derived some general principles that he
deemed essential to competition. For example, he found that
rivals act independently for the most part, rather than collu-
sively, and that each rival possesses reasonable knowledge of al-
ternative market opportunities.78 From his incisive descriptions
of collusive conduct and other facets of competition, courts and
legislators might have shaped the emerging tort doctrines in
terms more closely linked to the competitive process.
Ironically, the wide acceptance of Smith's economic doc-
trines led to the diminished interest of economists in the practi-
cal working of actual markets, because the economists who
followed Smith rejected his interest in actual markets.7 9 As a
leading contemporary economist has characterized this phase of
the history of economic thought, "'competition' entered eco-
nomics from common discourse, and for a long time it connoted
only the independent rivalry of two or more persons."80 Conse-
quently, the writings of economists underwent a methodologi-
cal change in which analysis of competition was expressed in
terms of abstract modelling.8' Viewing the process of competi-
77. As tort doctrines relating to competition were refined, courts and com-
mentators recognized an area of competition in which tort principles would
not apply. The Restatement of Torts provides for liability for "engaging in a
business primarily for the purpose of causing loss of business to another and
with the intention of terminating the business." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 709
(1938).
This rule codifies cases like Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W.
946, 948 (1909), in which a local banker sought vengeance rather than profit by
engaging in the barbering business. The Restatement, however, would impose
no liability for losses imposed upon a competitor when they arise from engag-
ing in business in "good faith." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 709 caveat (1938).
78. 1 A. SMITH, supra note 75, at 86-89.
79. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 1-3 (1957). See also Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical
Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1022-25 (1989) (arguing that the
relationship between the Sherman Act and the common law is difficult to un-
derstand because the common law of competition was changing rapidly at the
time the Act was passed).
80. Jones, supra note 68, at 905-06.
81. For example, by 1838, economic analysis had produced a mathemati-
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tion in abstract, formal terms, economists insulated their analy-
sis from concern with the behavior of traders in the
marketplace. As refined, mathematically expressed analysis
became the mode of economic reasoning;, the earlier concern
with the behavior of traders in actual markets lapsed. The be-
havioral content of competition was limited to the formal as-
sumptions that the model required; observations of conduct of
actual traders remained outside the analysis. One commentator
characterized this facet of the economic theory of competition
as follows:
There is a striking contrast in [the] economic literature between the
analytical rigor and precision of competition .. . and the ambiguity
surrounding the idea of competition whenever it is discussed in behav-
ioral terms.... [A] concept of economic competition, if it is to be sig-
nificant for economic policy, ought to relate to patterns of business
behavior .... That was the case with the competition which Adam
Smith made the central organizing principle in the Wealth of
NationS.82
The analysis of competition continued as an analytical
rather than a policy-oriented approach until the 1930s, when
the Great Depression thrust upon economists the task of ex-
plaining the collapse of a market economy. This response was
twofold. On the theoretical side, Edward Chamberlin in the
United States and Joan Robinson in England modified the con-
ventional structural elements of competition theory.83 Before
their work, the theory of competition took account of only two
theoretical market constructs: perfect competition and monop-
oly.84 Starting from different perspectives, Chamberlin and
Robinson each provided a theoretical model capable of explain-
ing the real world organization of markets that were a mixture
of competition and monopolys 5 From their contributions, it be-
came possible to explain, in theoretical terms, such actual mar-
ket behavior as using brand names and trademarks, advertising,
and price-cutting. In Chamberlin and Robinson's writings the
use of brand names and trademarks became part of the process
cally expressed definition of perfect competition. Moore, Paradoxes of Compe-
tition, 20 Q. J. ECON. 211, 220-27 (1906). Moore credits Cournot with the first
formal statement of perfect competition. Id at 213.
82. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q. J.
ECON. 639, 640 (1968).
83. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETrITION (1933);
J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETrITION (1933).
84. E. CHAMBERLI, supra note 83, at 3; J. ROBINSON, supra note 83, at 3.
85. For example, their work added the phrases "monopolistic competi-
tion" and "imperfect competition" to the economic vocabulary. E. CHAMBER-
LIN, supra note 83; J. ROBINSON, supra note 83.
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of product differentiation in which a seller sought to modify a
segment of the demand curve for a product by advertising the
product and by making the product distinctive in name, color,
or appearance.8 6 Although these developments returned the at-
tention of some economists to the working of actual markets
and to the decisional process of sellers, common law doctrines
isolated from economic analysis had already shaped the notion
of competition. Thus, cost, pricing, and output decisions re-
mained the domain of abstract economic analysis.8 7
In addition to the theoretical changes, the Depression
prompted the Roosevelt Administration to hire economists to
make empirical studies of the structure and behavior of actual
markets.88 From this combination of theoretical ana empirical
initiatives, a new branch of economics emerged, a body of ap-
plied economics called "industrial organization."8 9 A leading
industrial organization scholar describes the difference between
theoretical microeconomic analysis and industrial organization
economics: "The pure microeconomic theorist thrives on sim-
plicity and rigor; he is happiest when he can strip his model to
the barest few essential assumptions and variables. The indus-
trial organization economist is more inclined toward explana-
tions rich in both quantitative and institutional detail."9
Industrial organization economics differs from microeconomics
in two other respects: Industrial organization entails studying
in detail actual firms and industries from a historical, institu-
tional, and theoretical perspective,91 and it is concerned with
86. See J. DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING, AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR 6-17 (1949); Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest Legal Pro-
tection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168-75 (1948).
87. It is only recently that these decisions have been related to legal anal-
ysis. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 265-66 (1987) (concluding that trademark law, as a deriv-
ative of tort law in general, can best be explained on the hypothesis that the
law is trying to promote economic efficiency).
88. See, e.g., Fetter, The Fundamental Principle of E fficiency in Mass
Production, in RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND SMALL
BuSINESS 398 (TNEC Monograph No. 13, 1936) (discussing the relation of effi-
ciency to business size); see also G. MEANS, INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND THEIR IN-
FLExIBILrTY, S. Doc. No. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-19 (1935) (depression era
study of differences in agricultural and industrial prices); Means, Notes On In-
flexible Prices, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 23, 23-25 (Supp. 1936) (study of effects of
inflexible pricing).
89. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 2 (1970); W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER & ECONOMIC WELFARE 11-
23 (1970).
90. F. SCHERER, supra note 89, at 2.
91. See, e.g., W. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (4th ed.
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improving or adjusting market processes through government
intervention. The second feature has generated commentary
on legislation and judicial opinions involving market processes,
particularly in antitrust law - the closest point of tangency be-
tween law and economics.
92
These references to economic history and to the history of
economic thought suggest that examining the literature of in-
dustrial organization and related writings best serves the quest
to derive economic criteria with which to refine the vague doc-
trine of misappropriation in competitive terms. This industrial
organization literature has concerned itself with the decisional
behavior of traders in respect to cost, price, output, and market
share.
The development in the United States of laws dealing with
market behavior buttresses this conclusion. During the 1880s,
when economic analysis emphasized the development of an ab-
stract model of perfect competition, the market conduct of
large, aggressive corporations, such as Standard Oil Company,
energized the political process.9 3 The then dominant agrarian
sector of the economy demanded redress for such practices as
cutthroat pricing, secret rebates from railroads, a rapid merger
movement, and harsh treatment of employees. As state courts
used state laws to counter the practices of these large corpora-
tions, the corporations began to avoid the jurisdiction of the
state courts by forming trusts under the laws of another state
to hold the corporate stock. By enacting the Sherman Act in
1890, Congress used the general phrase "restraint of trade" to
regulate the decisions of business managers with regard to
costs, prices, and output.9 4 Because Congress was unable to
draw upon a body of economic analysis relating to actual mar-
kets and found no settled body of law beyond that of business
1970) (case studies of selected American industries); J. MARKHAM, COMPETI-
TION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY (1952) (study of competition and monopoly in
rayon industry); J. McKIE, TIN CANS AND TIN PLATE (1959) (study of competi-
tion in two related industries); W. NICHOLLS, PRICING POICIES IN THE CIGA-
RETTE INDUSTRY (1951) (analysis of price and production policies); M. PECK,
COMPETITION IN THE ALUMIM INDUSTRY (1965) (study of aluminum
industry).
92. See, e.g., Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Com-
petition, 45 AMER. ECON. REV. 29, 29-30 (1955) (discussing United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953). For a bibliography
of such works, see 8 A.E.A. READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUB-
Lic POLICY 393-426 (W. Heflebower & G. Stocking eds. 1958).
93. 1 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 3-12 (1958).
94. See supra note 9 (noting differing views on purpose of antitrust laws).
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torts, it turned to the broad, English common law doctrine of
restraint of trade.95
IV
In considering the INS case in an analytical context of the
economics of industrial organization, two questions arise. How
should the issue in the case be framed differently? Given that
INS and AP were competitors, is there an issue of unfairness in
INS incurring no cost except for copying, in obtaining the
news?
Clearly the copyright statute did not protect the news. The
court could have disposed of the case in favor of the defendant
by invoking the principle that unprotected matter may be
freely reproduced. Such an outcome, however, would have left
unresolved the residual issue of the "fairness" of INS in its un-
conventional acquisition of the basic ingredient of its product,
the news story. The lower courts had raised this fairness is-
sue.96 Because the copying of AP news was coupled with con-
duct of bribery and inducing breach of obligations, the
otherwise lawful copying became associated with illegal con-
duct and was tainted as a "dirty trick."
In intellectual property cases, courts frequently face allega-
tions of "piracy" and "dirty tricks," without having available a
core of analysis suited to drawing the line between "fair" com-
petition and its excesses. In Wainwright Securities, Inc. v.
Wall Street Transcript Corp.,97 a more recent copyright case in-
volving financial information, the Second Circuit expressed its
disdain for the conduct of a defendant who sold paraphrased
abstracts of the financial information copyrighted by the plain-
tiff.98 The court affirmed a preliminary injunction, rejecting
the fair use defense, noting that "the [defendant's] use of the
[plaintiffs'] reports was blatantly self-serving, with the obvious
intent ... of fulfilling the demand for the original work....
This was not legitimate coverage of a news event; instead it was
... chiseling for personal profit. 99
Although the court did not mention the misappropriation
95. W. LETwIN, LAW AND EcoNoMIc POLICY IN AMERICA 18-52 (1965).
96. The district court held INS's practice of acquiring the news amounted
to unfair trade, and the Second Circuit affirmed. International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 226-27, 231 (1918).
97. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
98. Id- at 96.
99. Id- (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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doctrine, the Wainwright case posed essentially the same doc-
trinal issue as INS because courts traditionally accord "thin"
copyright protection to both news and factual information. 00
Consequently, the same issue is framed: Does a legal doctrine
like misappropriation require competitors to incur the same
costs for the same inputs? To address this issue, however, one
must establish a context in which there is a working rationale
for the misappropriation doctrine. Placing the issues of fairness
and misappropriation in the context of competition may direct
judicial attention away from the fruitless task of characterizing
by unstated normative standards the market behavior of a com-
petitor. Instead, the issue becomes one of determining where to
draw the line between competition and its socially undesirable
excesses.
The Wainwright case demonstrates the difference in the
two approaches. The Wainwright court noted that the defend-
ant had contributed no independent research or analysis,101 but
failed to explain why this was relevant. Under copyright law,
only expression is protected; research is not.'0 2 Failing to con-
duct independent research triggers judicial disapproval that an
underlying legal doctrine does not support.
From this Essay's perspective, however, the Wainwright
case may be restated in the following terms. At the outset, the
context of competition reduces the significance of the ethical is-
sue. From this perspective, the parties, each engaged in a
profit-making activity, designed products for sale in a market in
which near substitutes were available. Each seller made deci-
sions that modified its cost/revenue calculus. The defendant,
perhaps on the advice of counsel, prepared its product without
seeking permission or paying a royalty, which from this per-
spective, was a cost-driven decision. As presented to the courts,
the only issue was whether copyright infringement occurred as
a result of that cost-saving decision. Despite the rhetoric of the
appellate court, 03 cost-saving is not akin to malum per se. Be-
cause the defendant raised the fair use defense, the court was
obliged to apply section 107, and particularly section 107(4), of
100. A newspaper story may be copyrighted as a literary work, but not the
news or factual element. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234.
101. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 96.
102. 1 P. GOLDSTEiN, COPYRIGHT § 2.14.4 (1989). See also Miller v. Univer-
sal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981) (research is not
copyrightable).
103. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 94-95.
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the Copyright Act,10 4 which makes relevant the potential mar-
ket impact of the defendant's action.10 5
Viewing Wainwright in the market context provides fur-
ther insight into the competitive relationship of the parties.
The record supports a finding that they sold different products
through different channels of distribution, although the court's
reference to "chiseling" implies that they sold the same prod-
uct. The facts state that the plaintiff's product consisted of full
financial information about 275 companies, including data about
personnel, finances, and sales. The opinion refers to reports
some forty pages in length that plaintiff sold directly to a clien-
tele of some 900 banks, insurance companies, and investors,
such as mutual funds. The defendant derived its product from
the information that the plaintiff's reports provided. Having
compiled this information, the defendant sold its product as a
weekly newspaper to an unstated number of subscribers con-
sisting of libraries, law and accounting firms, brokerage houses,
and corporations.1°
The significance of viewing the Wainwright opinion from
the market perspective is that it largely eliminates the ability
of a court to dispose of such a case by characterizing the con-
duct of a party as "chiseling," a doctrine with no analytical ba-
sis. Moreover, the market perspective provides a context in
which the relevant aspects of the competitive relationship are
clarified, leaving the court to determine the final outcome in
the case within the statutory framework - in this case, the
copyright statute. In these terms the issue could be framed
around section 107, the fair use defense. By expressly requiring
an inquiry into the market effects of the defendant's action on
the plaintiff, section 107(4) provides a framework of decision. 0 7
Thus, the Wainwright court might have decided for the
plaintiff, but only if the plaintiff could show that the defend-
ant's product was so strikingly similar to its own product to
permit the inference of copying.'-0 Alternatively, the court
might have decided in the defendant's favor under the fair use
doctrine. Copyright law traditionally affords weak protection
104. Id at 93-94. The court cites to 17 U.S.C. § 1, the earlier version of 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
105. See supra note 24.
106. See Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 93.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
108. The reported opinion suggests that the court did not address this issue
of unfairness by applying copyright norms; instead, the court decided the case
on the general issue of unethical behavior.
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to factual works.10 9 Absent a showing of economic injury, use
of protected factual material short of copying would not be
actionable.1' 0
Regardless of the outcome, however, the Wainwright court
should have focused on the issues in terms of the copyright
statute, because from this framework the court could articulate
the issue of economic injury. Such a focus enables a court to
ground its decision in a comprehensible rationale. In contrast,
by basing its decision on a subjective standard of ethical com-
mercial behavior of competitors, the court does little but ex-
press general disapproval of the defendant's conduct.
The federal antitrust cases involving predatory pricing pro-
vide some perspective on the decisional process required of a
court facing the task of distinguishing between appropriate
competitive behavior and conduct destructive of competition.11 1
Courts and commentators developed this body of law to give
content to the broad language of section two of the Sherman
Act that makes an "attempt to monopolize" illegal.112 The fed-
eral antitrust law is relevant to the misappropriation doctrine
in the following ways: It attaches to a course of conduct toward
competitors, and the conduct within this ambit includes "dirty
tricks" like industrial espionage, sabotage, threats, and false ad-
vertising, as well as traditional antitrust violations such as tying
arrangements and exclusive dealing."-3 Thus, predatory price
analysis centers the judicial inquiry on the specifics of cost and
109. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protec-
tion of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 516 (1981).
110. Id at 522.
111. See infra note 113. Some cases involving conduct destructive of com-
petition have arisen under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Hutter, Dirty Tricks
and Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Federalizing State Unfair Competition
Law, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 239, 240-41 (1977) (discussing types of
business activity prohibited under § 1 as interpreted by the Supreme Court).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
113. Although the Sherman Act overlaps with business torts largely in
terms of boycotts and predatory pricing, there have been a few cases in which
other business torts have become the basis of a Sherman Act cause of action.
E.g., Albert Pick Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 97, 100 (1st
Cir. 1932) (competitor induced rival's employees to join it and bring with them
customer lists, cost data, and other trade information); see also Atlantic Heel
Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1960) (induced employees
to leave, misappropriated trade secrets, disparaged products, interfered with
supply sources, and brought vexatious litigation); Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v.
Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 618, 620-21 (10th Cir. 1965) (induced employees
to leave and to urge former customers to trade with competitor).
For a thoughtful analysis of commercial conduct from the perspective of
an attempt to monopolize under the Sherman Act, see Cooper, Attempts and
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pricing practices of competitors instead of on general notions of
unfairness.
Analysis of the predatory pricing cases clarifies the misap-
propriation doctrine by providing a context of inquiry. This
context dispenses with the need to construct the question-beg-
ging "quasi-property" foundation on which the INS majority re-
lied. Predatory pricing analysis directly frames the market
conduct of a trader toward its rivals. By drawing on this analy-
sis, courts can examine misappropriation claims to determine
whether a seller acted with a purpose other than competi-
tion.1 14 For example, predatory pricing is a component of an at-
tempt to monopolize when a company, as part of a plan
designed to inflict losses on competitors such that they leave
the market, makes a pricing decision to sell its products at less
than their "cost." Predatory pricing is also part of the offense of
predation, such as when a seller plans to recoup its losses from
selling below "cost" by charging a "monopoly" price1 5 after its
rivals are driven from the market. 1 6
Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of
Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1974).
114. Competition in the antitrust sense, such as predatory pricing, suggests
a rivalry in which a seller offers a superior product at a price lower than aver-
age variable cost. This conduct becomes improper when the seller embarks on
a course of conduct designed to destroy a rival - selling below average varia-
ble cost - with the intent to recoup any losses by charging higher than nor-
mal prices after the rival has been destroyed. For an example of a similar
case, see Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909), discussed infra at
note 130 and accompanying text.
115. A monopoly price is one yielding a return above normal profit
margins.
116. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec-
tion Two of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) [hereinafter
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing). See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 9, 1 715 (noting that a monopolist's predatory pricing can threaten
the survival of equally efficient rivals). Predatory pricing is one aspect of busi-
ness conduct which has the purpose of advancing the perpetrator's market po-
sition by means other than offering a better product or service at a lower
price. Examples of predatory behavior not relating to price would include con-
duct seeking to drive actual or potential competitors from the market by
threats or intimidation, concentrating sales effort on the customers of a com-
petitor, and making exclusive arrangements among a few sellers. An analysis
of past and recent predatory practices is given by Cassady & Brown, Exclu-
sionary Tactics in American Business Competition: An Historical Analysis, 8
UCLA L. REv. 88 (1961). Another example of predatory exclusion is reported
in the famous Mogul S.S. case, Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co., 23
Q.B.D. 598 (1889). There, a group of established steamship operators agreed to
share the existing tea trade in the Far East by excluding any new entrant. In
this case, predatory pricing was employed against a would-be, non-member en-
trant. The existing ship owners would quote a below-cost price in order to
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Analogizing to predatory pricing analysis when analyzing
misappropriation claims has the further advantage of requiring
courts to examine the boundaries of "appropriate" competition
in cost/price terms, rather than in ethical terms.117 By examin-
ing the cost position of competitors in the market, courts can
more sharply focus on the nature of the competitors' rivalry.
Applying this approach to INS, the Court would have inquired
whether a legal principle requires competitors to bear the same
mix of costs. This inquiry would have required the Court to de-
termine whether the second entrant in the market, INS,
breached some policy interest when it appropriated an unpro-
tected input of a rival seller, the news stories of AP.
A proposal that Areeda and Turner originally made is use-
ful at this point. Areeda and Turner suggested a direct,
straightforward test to determine when a seller's pricing is
"predatory.' 1 s Under their analysis, short-run marginal cost
would be the touchstone of whether a seller was engaging in
predatory pricing.119 As a concession to evidentiary considera-
tions, they ultimately adopted short-run average variable cost
as the test because reasonable cost accounting methods made it
easier to determine. 20 Under this test, if the plaintiff showed
that the defendant sold its product below short-run average va-
riable cost, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of preda-
deter entry. This case is analyzed by Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes
and Comments, 15 J. L. & ECON. 129, 137-42 (1972). The most famous antitrust
case of predatory conduct involves the Standard Oil Trust. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The correctness of that decision is questioned
by McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil of New Jersey Case, 1 J.
L. & ECON. 137, 137-38 (1958).
117. Although this perspective is not a rosetta stone for deciding all cases,
it does afford a court faced with a misappropriation claim an evidentiary basis
- in terms of cost - to distinguish an "unfair" or "dirty trick" situation from
a properly competitive situation.
118. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing, supra note 116, at 712-13; see
also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 9, % 715. The substantial case law
developing predatory pricing analysis centers around Areeda & Turner's
proposal.
119. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 9, V 715; Areeda & Turner, Pred-
atory Pricing, supra note 116, at 712-13.
120. Marginal cost is defined as the addition to total cost attributable to the
production of one additional unit of output. Although an important theoretical
construct for analytical purposes, obtaining the data for an actual production
process is recognized as involving substantial complexity. Average costs com-
port more closely with actual record keeping. C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 179-204 (4th ed. 1975).
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tion,121 which would prompt a full scale factual inquiry. 22
Two elements relevant to misappropriation analysis may be
drawn from this concept: low prices are the essence of competi-
tion, and costs are the determinants of supply.m From this
perspective, conduct of a rival such as the taking of the news by
INS is considered as a cost-saving action, the significance of
which is best determined by viewing the conduct in a competi-
tive context. This approach eliminates the need for a "quasi-
property" rationale. A court should note, however, that any
legal restraint on the decision of a seller to lower prices runs
the risk of undercutting the competitive process itself. Indeed,
the insensitivity of the INS majority to the process of competi-
tion is its singular defect.
In addition, pricing decisions of sellers are not meaning-
fully considered outside the market structure in which the
practice occurs. Courts recently have recognized this limitation
by taking market structure into account when assessing price
behavior as predatory.124 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
taken the position that recoupment from lost sales is unlikely
unless barriers to the entry of new competitors exist; thus, low
prices alone are not probative of predation.us
This discussion suggests that pricing decisions are central
to competition; moreover, because costs are the determinants of
121. Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738, 751-52 (1981).
122. The meandering course of this doctrine in the courts and law reviews
is beyond the scope of present concern. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 264, 268-76 (1981) (arguing that
predatory pricing is not rational economic behavior).
123. Areeda and Turner, in their exposition of predatory prices defined va-
riable costs as including "only the following: (1) capital costs (interest on debt
and opportunity cost of share capital) attributable to investment in land, plant,
and equipment; (2) property and other taxes unaffected by output; and (3) de-
preciation on plant." See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 9, 1 715c. They
also advocated that the elements of average variable cost be defined at the out-
set in each case. Id
124. R. BORx, supra note 9, at 145; Easterbrook, supra note 122, at 268.
125. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15
(1986), the Court, in dictum, expressed doubt that predatory pricing could take
place by a firm which only had a 21% share of the market. The Court adopted
the view of Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284, 292 (1977), that predatory pricing would not be viable for a
firm with less than a 60% market share. In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1986), the Court again stated that the
defendant would not be able to recoup from a below cost sales period by charg-
ing supranormal prices in the future unless there were substantial barriers to
the entry of new firms.
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supply, courts should consider costs as the gateway to the pro-
duction of competing products. Consequently, courts should
also view cost savings, such as taking news stories without per-
mission or payment, as governing the possibility of entry by a
competitor. The context in which courts view cost decisions
should include evidence of the existing firm's market position.
Thus, when a new competitor seeks to enter a market domi-
nated by a single seller whose sole access to a basic input virtu-
ally forecloses rivals, the newcomer may lawfully rely on the
fact that the input - in the INS case, the news - is not within
the scope of copyright protection. Thus, this approach allows
courts to avoid the need to characterize the conduct of a de-
fendant as a "pirate" or a "chiseler," but rather to view the con-
duct as a cost-saving activity and to consider its significance in a
competitive context.
The Wainwright case demonstrates the superiority of this
approach. In the actual decision, the defendant never fully
presented its copyright issue. It raised the fair use defense, but
the court rested its decision on the "chiseling" misappropriation
of the plaintiff's material. 2 6 The characterization of the de-
fendant's conduct foreclosed the copyright issue of market ef-
fect, an analysis that section 107(4) of the Copyright Act
requires. Although the case seems to hold that the defendant
misappropriated the plaintiff's material, the copyright analysis
is lacking.m The Court ignored the issue of infringement and
the application of the fair use defense. The outcome might well
have rested on a finding of substantial taking, which in a com-
mercial context forecloses fair use. Conversely, the court might
have concluded that, as a fact, the plaintiff was entitled to
"thin" protection, which would give judgment to the defendant
in the absence of a showing of economic harm.
This approach should also apply to the INS case. From the
suggested perspective, a court would frame the issue at the out-
set as whether INS breached any competitive legal norm when
it sold a product in competition with AP without incurring the
same costs of producing that product. To decide the issue,
courts could look to the predatory pricing literature, as well as
the equally voluminous literature of price discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act or the calculation of "foreign market
126. Wainwright Securities, Inc., v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).




value" under the anti-dumping provisions of the Trade Act. 28
This perspective would demonstrate that AP had a differ-
ent cost structure from INS in acquiring the basic input of the
competing products. In the actual case, the record contained no
evidence on cost or prices, but it may be assumed for purposes
of exposition that news gathering costs were significant, consti-
tuting, perhaps, forty percent of the plaintiff's total variable
costs. By viewing the parties as competitors with this cost dif-
ferential in mind, the court would decide whether the defend-
ant's conduct was predatory being designed to destroy AP as a
competitor. At least one court has applied such an analysis.2 9
In the famous Minnesota barber case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized that commercial conduct that seeks ven-
geance rather than profit may be outside the competitive arena
and actionable in tort. 30
128. Price discrimination within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988), means two sales made at two different prices. The econ-
omist's definition means two sales made at two different rates of return to the
seller - meaning different cost structures. See Spence, Product Selection,
Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REv. ECON. STUD. 217, 217
(1976). Courts often confuse these issues to the detriment of competitive out-
comes. See, e.g., Utah Pie v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702-03, 703
n.15 (1967).
In the trade legislation, the emphasis is also on "fairness" among rival
sellers in international transactions. Again, the determination is made by ref-
erence to prices and to their underlying cost structures. Congress, in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(b) (1988), provided the most complex formulary approach to determin-
ing whether the foreign seller's price in the United States is a competitive,
"fair" price or constitutes "dumping." This provision requires alternative ways
of computing the foreign market value of a product imported into the United
States as the reference point of decision. In addition to the actual selling price
in the normal course of business by unrelated persons, a statutory "con-
structed value" may be used. This calculation begins with the cost of materials
and requires the addition of processing costs, general expenses, and profit.
The amount of profit is also limited.
The relevance of these other pricing statutes to misappropriation is the
emphasis on the relationship between costs, including cost saving, and price in
characterizing the competition as "fair" or "unfair."
129. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
130. A famous Minnesota case states a variant of predatory pricing by hold-
ing that seeking vengeance under the guise of competition is actionable in tort.
See id The Minnesota Supreme Court held actionable the competition of a
banker with the established local barber by equipping a shop and giving it
rent-free to another barber as part of a program to drive the established local
barber from the town. Id at 151-52, 119 N.W. at 948. The court distinguished
competition from the destruction of trade as follows:
To divert to one's self the customers of a business rival by the offer of
goods at lower prices is in general a legitimate mode of serving one's
own interest, and justifiable as fair competition. But when a man
starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit ...
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Alternatively, the court might have considered AP's status
as a participant in a competitive market for the sale of newspa-
pers and advertising. By recognizing that the AP news was not
copyrighted, the court might have considered whether INS
caused AP any economic injury outside the bounds of commer-
cial rivalry. From this perspective, Justice Brandeis's dissent
might better have been the majority opinion. Absent a finding
of predatory, extra-commercial conduct, the court would con-
sider the responsive alternatives open to AP. The court might
conclude that AP suffered no long-term injury because it could
seek, at little cost, to copyright its stories as a means of ob-
taining injunctive relief against actual piracy. In the alterna-
tive, AP, at modest cost, could secure its bulletin boards and
enforce its by-laws by expelling from membership those who
assisted INS. In addition, AP could have used its control over
the news stories to create a lead-time advantage by delaying the
transmission of the stories to its west coast members by an
hour or so. This delay would thwart INS attempts to copy the
news stories, thus causing west coast INS papers to miss an edi-
tion or an entire day.131
Finally, the court might follow the dissent of Justice
Holmes and hold that the taking was not actionable, but pro-
vide AP name recognition and credit in the marketplace. Be-
cause the INS majority failed to address any of these issues at
the core of the competitive process, its opinion gave rise to an
ad hoc rationale 'grounded only in a reaction to distasteful con-
duct and therefore devoid of analytical content.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argues for a limitation on the application of the
misappropriation doctrine. Two factors support this conclusion.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked fed-
eral preemption to preclude state law intrusion into issues of
competition. Courts should extend this principle to inhibit fed-
eral judges from applying federal common law doctrines, such
as misappropriation, in cases arising under federal intellectual
property laws. In addition, as courts presently apply the misap-
regardless of the loss to himself and for the sole purpose of driving his
competitor out of business .... he is guilty of ... an actionable tort.
I& at 151, 119 N.W. at 948.
131. This lead time benefit is noted by Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right- A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,
84 HARv. L. REV. 281, 299-302 (1970).
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propriation doctrine, it cannot serve the function of a broad eq-
uitable principle suited to restrain the excesses of competitive
behavior.
This Essay recognizes the need for such a limiting doctrine.
Thus, the Essay contends that the misappropriation doctrine be
given analytical content by examining misappropriation issues
in the context of competitive markets. By viewing the conduct
of a defendant from the perspective of a cost-saving, market en-
trant, courts can avoid engaging in subjective assessments of
the ethical nature of certain competitive behavior. By eliminat-
ing such assessments, courts are better able to draw the line be-
tween socially beneficial economic rivalry consistent with
competition, and anti-social, destructive conduct inconsistent
with competition. In this model, judicial attention will be cen-
tered on the intellectual property law principles at issue, leav-
ing courts to draw on the misappropriation doctrine in the
relatively rare instances when traditional intellectual property
principles lead to perverse and unacceptable outcomes.
